Abstract
Introduction The progress of US missile defence since the Cold War
The text focuses on the development of US ballistic missile defence (BMD) 1 and the significance of regional missile defence cooperation relying on US technologies and leadership (to include the South Korean and Polish perspective). The text aims also to address the Trump administration's policies towards missile threats in the context of technology development and new challenges in the international environment, i.e. dangerous nuclear and ballistic programs of Pyongyang, which created a threat of a regional WMD conflict.
The increased US investments of the 1980s within Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) brought a concept of an orbital missile defence system, which in a longer perspective would provide a shelter against a massive strategic nuclear strike. In 1989, the US gave up on deploying the SDI, focusing instead on a narrower missile defence system. Alternatives subsequently emerged. The George H. W. Bush administration advocated for Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS) while Bill Clinton modified the design to introduce National Missile Defence (NMD) without space-based interceptors (Baucom, The Rise and Fall of Brilliant Pebbles, 164-65; Baucom, US Missile Defense Program 1944 -1994 Dabrowski, 15) . In December 2001 the G. W. Bush administration decided to withdraw from an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) treaty of 1972 in a new security environment after September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Bush jr. administration plan of additional sites of a Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) in Eastern Europe (in Poland and Czech Republic) was abandoned by Barack Obama administration in 2009, which reduced earlier plans of GMD deployment in Europe to Aegis Ashore bases in Romania and Poland. Notably, New START agreements signed by the US and Russia in Prague in 2010 were leading to a limitation of deployed strategic warheads of both sides to the level of 1550 for each signatory, on all three legs of strategic triad altogether (DoS b).
The twenty first century's US missile defence was formed on the bases of a longrange intercontinental component (GMD) The total 2019 BMD funding grew to USD 11.5 bn through Congressional action in March 2018 (Judson) . MDA's budget in 2018-2023 timeframe plans covered mostly research expenditures on the level of USD 6 bn (see table 1 ). Those expenses supposed to be a technological hedge against enemy's ICBM (and other ballistic, WMD carriers) progress, as in the case of North Korea. Importantly, 2019 funding was supposed to help to increase GBI number by 20 to 64 due to North Korean proliferation dangers (The White House a 37). Missile defence programs accounted for 5% of 2019 defence modernization programs i.e. USD 236.7 bn (Comptroller 1). MDA director Samuel Greaves in April 2018 justified further increased MDA funding mostly by North Korean threat (Greaves, 1) . New technological challenges for US BMD included supersonic-hypersonic cruise missiles launched by rockets, and hypersonic gliders (Greaves, 1) . The most important tests planned by MDA in 2019 were European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) phase 3 capabilities and salvo test of GMD (Greaves, 8) . Polish Aegis Ashore base built since 2016 was to be delivered by 2020 delayed by two years "due to unsatisfactory rate of construction progress", with a capacity to launch SM-3 Block II, scheduled for deployment in the operational Romanian base (Greaves, 26, (30) (31) . BMD technology improvements included multi-object kill vehicle (MOKV) for GMD (a program cancelled by Obama administration and reinvigorated after five years) aimed to place more intercepting vehicles in one interceptor to engage more targets (Greaves, 37) .
Missile defence in US national security policy under D. Trump
Key security documents of Trump administration explained the significance of BMD in the light of North Korean threat, as well as Russia's and China's ballistic-nuclear advances. Trump administration's National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2017 mentioned advanced missile proliferation with an eye on North Korea and Iran among main challenges, countered by a new-layered missile defence system developed to protect US homeland (NSS, (3) (4) 8, 26) . A US BMD response to missile threats from Russia and China (potentially highly dangerous for US command centres and critical infrastructure) was to be limited by requirements of maintaining strategic stability between Washington, Moscow and Beijing (NSS, (3) (4) 8, 26) . National Defense Strategy (NDS) of 2018 distinguished among key international security challenges the ballistic threat of revisionist powers and rogue regimes, such as North Korea and Iran, contained by layered and area BMD (NDS, 2, 6). NDS called for enhanced capabilities of the Joint Force in integrating air and missile defence to counter mobile platforms and an improvement of close combat skills adapted to difficult terrain (NDS, 2, 6).
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2018 mentioned that Russia was modernizing its older nuclear-tipped BMD and introducing newly designed systems in the field while Russia's political pressure was undermining US missile defence efforts (NPR, 9). Similarly, as NPR stated, China hugely increased its BMD by a future GMD system testing and planned sea-based midcourse and area systems (NPR, 11). US BMD capacities were to strengthen extended deterrence by damage limiting scenarios, introduced among other non-nuclear (conventional deterrence) measures (NPR, 23). In the North Korean case, missile defence in allied cooperation could support first strike options aimed to downgrade Pyongyang's missile attack before it was able to engage targets i.e. "prior to launch" (NPR, 33). Advances in missile defence technologies used by competing powers were justifying further modernization of US strategic triad, including the replacement of Ohio SSBN class (by Columbia class) and Minuteman III ICBM (NPR, 45).
Steps towards Patriot BMD in Poland
The 2015 Patriot contract with Poland, announced after the public offering was won by Raytheon, included the purchase of US equipment worth USD 2.5 bn within the broader expenses of USD 5 bn on Wisła air and missile defence system, being a part of 10-year program of Polish Armed Forces modernization worth USD 45 bn (DoS a). According to the Polish Ministry of National Defence (MON) the basic task of Polish Patriot would be to counter Russian Iskander (optionally nuclear-tipped) short-range missiles (MON b). Due to Memorandum of Understanding announced in July 2017, the PAC-3 delivery to Poland would begin in 2022, so the missiles could reach operational ability in 2023 (MON c). In November 2017 Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced the approval of Secretary of State to sell to Poland PAC-3 systems (DSCA; Stone). The agreement between Poland and US on Patriot delivery was signed on March 28, 2018. The value of the contract was USD 4.75 bn (the negotiated price was reaching even USD 10.5 bn due to technological requirements) for two batteries with 16 launchers and 208 missiles scheduled on 2022, to be operationally ready between 2023-2024 (MON a; US Embassy). Among the controversial issues remained combat effectiveness of PAC units (while its tests results showed 86-88% reliability). Since the Kuwait war, when the US attempted to upgrade Patriot quickly from air defence weapons to missile defence capacity (to hit Al-Hussein missiles reaching a speed of up to 2200 metres per second) the effectiveness of PAC was put in doubt (McMahon, 297) . T. Postol (170) critically claimed that real-time PAC performance at the time was much lower than the official government records.
North Korean crisis
In the time of Pyongyang's dangerous thermonuclear and ICBM tests, Donald Trump's administration took a difficult attempt to increase pressure on North Korea by stricter sanctions along with broader defence ties with Seoul (including THAAD deployments) and Tokyo, threatened by Pyongyang's aggressive proliferation policies. The analysed scenarios included even a first strike against North Korean nuclear facilities while the US kept all military options opened.
Key North Korean missile accomplishments by 2017 from MDA's perspective included launches of Hwasong-14 ICBM and Hwasong-15 ICBM, as well as Hwasong-12 IRBM (Greaves, 4) . The deployment of THAAD battery in South Korea, operational since 2017, was to support the layered missile defence in the region, earlier based on Aegis and PAC (US Army; Choon). Due to US assessments, the sharp PRC's criticism of THAAD in South Korea was based on Beijing's view that the system was de facto aimed at Chinese strategic capacities (Meick, Salidjanova, 3) .
Importantly, THAAD battery deployed in Seongju country with a 200 km range could not intercept all missiles attacking South Korea, including those targeting Seoul, as well as in the case of salvo multiple short-range missile attacks, potentially countered by Patriot and Aegis engagement (Kang) . High THAAD reliability according to RAND expert was needed due to the threat posed by North Korean NoDong and medium range Musudan missiles (Bennett) .
As Scott Sagan (73) noted, US intelligence data showed that by November 2017 North Korean regime gathered an arsenal of 60 nuclear warheads (while its ability to install them on missiles capable of reaching continental US was questioned) and "window of opportunity" for effective pre-emptive strike stopping Pyongyang's nuclear armaments should be seen as closed.
Ground-breaking compromise on the prospects of the denuclearization after the long crisis appeared possible due to the spirit of Pyongchang Olympics, which opened path to détente. Notably, South Korea's Moon Jae-in skilful diplomacy and surprising Kim Jong-un's willingness to compromise, led to breakthrough declaration on demilitarizing the North's nuclear program, delivered on April 
BMD test results and probability analysis
In Dean Wilkening explained -in reference to J. Bernoulli binomial distribution -the probability P(x) of defeating the BMD by x number of incoming warheads by an equation:
where K w meant the (single) probability of detection and interception of an incoming warhead by an interceptor, W stood for the amount of attacking warheads, in the case of defeating all warheads (and x = o) P(0) = (K w ) W (Wilkening, (187) (188) . (Wilkening, (187) (188) .
Chart 2. The probability of defeating the missile defence by from 0 to 5 warheads in Bernoulli distribution for interceptors' SSKP = 82% and a simultaneous attack of 5 warheads Source: as above.
The table and chart show the probability of defeating the BMD by a given amount of attacking warheads (from 0 to 5) when 5 warheads attack and Single Shot Kill Probability (SSKP), i.e. the likelihood of interception of a single attacking warhead by a single defending missile, reaches 82%. In this case the highest probability 0.41 (41%) is attributed to the outcome of one warhead breaking through the defences, slightly smaller (37%) chances are attributed to a full (leakproof) interception, i.e. 0 warheads would defeat the defence. Laura Grego, George N. Lewis, David Wright (1, 5) referring to earlier Dean Wilkening's model of intercept probability explained the lowering chances of intercept with the increasing number of incoming warheads through an equation: 1 -P(0) = 1 -p n where n stands for the number of incoming warheads and p for a SSKP (interception probability), the right side of an equation shows the probability that at least one of the incoming warheads would defeat the BMD, e.g. for SSKP = 95% the non-leakproof probability for the attack of 5 warheads reached 0.23 i.e. 1 − 0.95 5 . 
The comparison of Bernoulli and Poisson distribution was introduced after Janina Jóźwiak and Jarosław Podgórski (137-139). The probabilities referring to the 0-5 warheads defeating the BMD while 5 warheads attacked and SSKP equalled 82% (close to the mean effectiveness of all US BMD components), signified a small advantage of a probability that one warhead would defeat the defence (over the probability of a leakproof interception) in Bernoulli distribution and slight advantage of a probability of a leakproof interception over a scenario that one warhead would defeat the missile defence system in Poisson distribution. 
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The probability that 7 or more warheads would defeat the BMD were below 1 percent. Source: own counting based on Wilkening model of Bernoulli distribution (187-188). The probabilities of 10 or more warheads defeating the BMD were below 1%. Table 4 and chart 4 show that for five attacking warheads (and interceptors' SSKP = 87%) chances of a leakproof interception (0 warheads penetrating the defence) stood at 0.50 (50%). There was a 37% probability that one warhead would break through the defence and 11% that two warheads would defeat the defence (table 4, column second from the left, under "5"). The leakproof intercept probability was obviously decreasing when larger number of warheads attacked simultaneously, i.e. leakproof intercept probability fell to 43% in a scenario of a defence against six warheads, while under such conditions the probability of one warhead passing through the defence stood at 39% (table 4, column third from the left, under "6"). The introduction of additional interceptors could not save the leakproof perspectives under the condition of salvo attack of more than 15 warheads without SSKP improvements, for SSKP at 87% (see table 6, chart 7). It is noteworthy that it may be more effective to increase SSKP than add more missiles to BMD.
Chart 5. Probabilities that 0-12 warheads would defeat the BMD (interceptors' SSKP = 87%) in Bernoulli distribution, for 16-30 warheads (salvo attack) The probability that 12 or more warheads would defeat the BMD were below 1 percent. Source: as above.
George N. Lewis explained the layered defence reliability according to the equation showing the probability of a leakproof interception
where p stood for SSKP and n for the number of layers of BMD system, or interceptors (Lewis, 1418 (Lewis, -1438 . In this analysis (regarding salvo attacks and additional interceptors) in place of SSKP a probability of leakproof salvo interception was used.
Chart 6. Probability of defeating the BMD (interceptors' SSKP = 87%) by 1 or more warheads for 5-30 warheads (salvo attack) Source: as above. Source: own counting based on Dean Wilkening (187-188) model and P(0) = 1 -(1 -p) n according to George N. Lewis (1418 Lewis ( -1438 model.
Chart 7. Effects of additional interceptors (from 2 to 25 against 1 warhead) when 5-30 warheads attack: probability of a leakproof interception, SSKP = 87% Source: as above. The included tables and charts show the necessity of SSKP improvement (more important than plain adding more BMD missiles) to provide for a leakproof intercept chances in multiple warheads salvo attacks. The probability analysis proves that even a (costly) engagement of 5 and more interceptors against each of salvo attacking warheads for SSKP below 90% could not secure a leakproof interception (important against WMD threats). As the presented case of 87%-high SSKP (close to PAC-3) shows, even too costly and unrealistic engagement of 10 interceptors against each attacking warhead would not bring a leakproof interception when more than 20 warheads attack simultaneously. In this example the rise of SSKP from 87% to 93% could improve the leakproof chances intercept higher than proportionally (to SSKP increase). At SSKP level equalling 93% a hypothetical use of 5 interceptors against each of the warheads attacking simultaneously (a salvo) could provide for a 45% probability of a leakproof interception in a scenario of a defence against 30 warheads incoming simultaneously while at the SSKP level equalling 87% the leakproof intercept chances in an analogous case reached only 7%, i.e. 6 percentage points SSKP increase (from 87 to 93) raised leakproof intercept probability by 38 percentage points.
Conclusion
By the time of Donald Trump's first years in office, the US BMD progress opened a perspective of a low-leaking defence, reaching a reliability above 80%, towards the 90% level. Nonetheless, the nuclear dimension of threats posed by contemporary dictatorships, most visible in the case of North Korea, led to a verification of predictions of missile defence effectiveness to focus on the chances of leakproof performance (highly important in the case of WMD-tipped warheads). Therefore, the abilities of political mitigation of emerging conflicts related to rogue states equipped with nuclear weapons appear to be conditioned by the capacity of the leading peacekeeper to provide for a leakproof interception. The official state-of-the-arts of BMD technology available by 2017-2018 could bring the partial perspective of terminal leakproof defence through THAAD (with its perfect test results, but no combat experience). Present-day PAC performance still needs to be improved to rely on such an interceptor to provide for a leakproof scenario in the future. The development of GMD' SSKP to high-level performance appears to be more difficult and costly, while it would require a maturing technology of multiple-object kill vehicle, among others, to create future perspective of a defence against decoys released with warheads (MIRV) using low number of GBI's. The present development of Aegis system (after Barack Obama administration cancelled its intercontinental stage) still could not fill a dangerous gap in BMD systems of the US and its allies, weakened in an important dimension by relatively low test results of midcourse defence segment.
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